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Abstract—In protocol verification we observe a wide spectrum
from fully automated methods to interactive theorem proving
with proof assistants like Isabelle/HOL. The latter provide over-
whelmingly high assurance of the correctness, which automated
methods often cannot: due to their complexity, bugs in such
automated verification tools are likely and thus the risk of erro-
neously verifying a flawed protocol is non-negligible. There are a
few works that try to combine advantages from both ends of the
spectrum: a high degree of automation and assurance. We present
here a first step towards achieving this for a more challenging
class of protocols, namely those that work with a mutable long-
term state. To our knowledge this is the first approach that
achieves fully automated verification of stateful protocols in an
LCF-style theorem prover. The approach also includes a simple
user-friendly transaction-based protocol specification language
embedded into Isabelle, and can also leverage a number of
existing results such as soundness of a typed model.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are at least three reasons why it is desirable to perform
proofs of security in a proof assistant like Isabelle/HOL or
Coq. First, it gives us an overwhelming assurance that the
proof of security is actually a proof and not just the result of
a bug in a complex verification tool. This is because the basic
idea of an LCF-style theorem prover is to have an abstract
datatype theorem so that new theorems can only be constructed
through functions that correspond to accepted proof rules; thus
implementing just this datatype correctly prevents us from ever
accepting a wrong proof as a theorem, no matter what complex
machinery we build for automatically finding proofs. Second, a
human may have an insight of how to easily prove a particular
statement where a “stupid” verification algorithm may run into
a complex check or even be infeasible. Third, the language of
a proof assistant can formalize all accepted mathematics, so
there is no narrow limit on what aspects of a system we can
formalize, e.g., physical properties.
Paulson [1] and Bella [2] developed a protocol model in
Isabelle and performed several security proofs in this model,
e.g., [3]. That the proof of a single protocol (for which even
some automated security proofs exist) is worth a publication,
underlines how demanding it is to conduct proofs in a proof
assistant. This raised the question of how one can automati-
cally produce proofs that can be checked by a proof assistant
and thus get the mentioned overwhelming assurance. The first
works in this direction consider tools based on Horn-clause
resolution like ProVerif [4], [5], as well as the tool Scyther-
proof [6] for the backward-search based tool Scyther [7].
A drawback of these approaches so far is that they only
apply to Alice-and-Bob style protocols where there is no
relation between several sessions. When we consider, however,
any system that maintains a mutable long-term state, e.g., a
security token or a server that maintains a simple database, we
hit the limits of tools like ProVerif and Scyther. To cope with
the complexity, some extensions to ProVerif have been pro-
posed [8], [9], but also a tool that went a completely different
way: Tamarin [10] is actually inspired by Scyther-proof and
has the flavor of a proof assistant environment itself, namely
combining partial automation with interactively performing a
proof, i.e., supplying the right lemmas to show. Interestingly,
there is no connection to Isabelle or other LCF-style theorem
provers, while one may intuitively expect that this should be
easily possible. The reason seems to be that Tamarin combines
several specialized automated methods, especially for term
algebraic reasoning, that would be quite difficult to “translate”
into Isabelle/HOL—at least the authors of this paper do not
see an easy way to make such a connection. In fact, if it was
possible for a large class of stateful protocols, the combination
of overwhelming assurance of proofs and a high degree of
automation would be extremely desirable.
The goal of this work is to achieve exactly this combination
for a well-defined fragment of stateful protocols. We are here
using as a foundation the Isabelle/HOL formalization and
protocol model by Hess et al. [11]. One reason for this choice
is that the proof technique we present in this paper works only
in a restricted typed model. Fortunately, that formalization
ships with a typing result [12], namely an Isabelle theorem
that says: if a protocol is secure in this typed model, then it is
also secure in the full model without the typing restriction—
as long as the protocol in question satisfies a number of basic
requirements. Thus we get fully automated Isabelle proofs for
most protocols even without a typing restriction.
The automated proof technique we employ in this paper is
based on the set-based abstraction approach of [13], [14]. The
basic idea is that we represent the long-term state of a protocol
by a number of sets; the protocol rules specify how protocol
participants shall insert elements into a set, remove them from
a set, and check for membership or non-membership. (The
intruder may also be given access to some sets.) Based on this,
we perform an abstract interpretation approach that identifies
those elements that have the same membership status in all
sets and compute a fixed point, more precisely a representation
of all messages that the intruder can ever know after any
trace of the protocol (including the set membership status of
elements that occur in these messages). One may wonder if
considering just intruder-known messages limits the approach
to secrecy goals, but thanks to sets, a wide range of trace-based
properties can be expressed by reduction to the secrecy of a
special constant attack. (We cannot, however, handle privacy-
type properties in this way.)
We thus check if the fixed point contains the attack con-
stant, and if so, we can abort the attempt to prove the protocol
correct. This may happen also for a secure protocol as the ab-
straction entails an over-approximation. However, vice-versa,
if attack is not in the fixed point, then the protocol should
be secure—if the fixed point is indeed a sound representation
of the messages the intruder can ever know. The proof we
perform in Isabelle now is thus basically to show that the
fixed point is closed under every protocol rule: given any trace
where the intruder knows only messages covered by the fixed
point, then every extension by one protocol step reveals only
messages also covered by the fixed point.
The main contribution of this paper is the Isabelle imple-
mentation of a mechanism to both compute the abstract fixed
point—the proof idea so to speak—and to then break it down
into digestible pieces for Isabelle. This proof consists of two
main parts: first, we have a number of protocol-independent
theorems that we have proved in Isabelle once and for all,
and second, for every protocol and fixed point, we have a
number of checks that Isabelle can directly execute to establish
the correctness of a given protocol. The entire protocol-
independent formalization consists of more than 15,000 lines
of Isabelle code (definitions, theorems and proofs). This figure
includes also another minor contribution: we devise a simple
protocol specification language into Isabelle that overcomes
some drawbacks of low-level input languages like (multi-
)set rewriting rules used in some other tools. The complete
formalization is available at the Archive of Formal Proofs as
the entry titled Automated Stateful Protocol Verification [15]:
https://www.isa-afp.org/entries/Automated_Stateful_Protocol_
Verification.html
The latest development version and related works can be found
at the following webpage:
https://people.compute.dtu.dk/samo/composec.html
This gives us thus a fully automated approach to generate
proofs of highest assurance for a relevant class of stateful
security protocols. This class is limited by the automated
method behind it, most notably we can only insert atomic
messages into the sets, but allows for full automation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
introduces preliminaries, Section III defines the protocol
model, Section IV explains the set-based abstraction approach,
Section V introduces the protocol checks with optimizations
introduced in Section VI, Section VII presents and reports on
the results of a number of experiments applying our approach
to a selection of protocols, and finally Section VIII is the
conclusion where we also discuss related work.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Terms and Substitutions
We model terms over a countable set Σ of symbols (also
called function symbols or operators) and a countable set V of
variables disjoint from Σ. Each symbol in Σ has an associated
arity and we denote by Σn the symbols of Σ of arity n. A
term built from S ⊆ Σ and X ⊆ V is then either a variable
x ∈ X or a composed term of the form f(t1, . . . , tn) where
each ti is a term built from S and X , and f ∈ Sn. The set of
terms built from S and X is denoted by T (S,X). Arbitrary
terms t usually range over T (Σ,V), unless stated otherwise.
By subterms(t) we denote the set of subterms of t.
The set of constants C is defined as the symbols with arity
zero: C ≡ Σ0. It contains the following distinct subsets:
• the countable set V of concrete values (or just values),
• the finite set A of abstract values,
• the finite set E of enumeration constants,
• the finite set S of database constants,1
• and a special constant attack.
The analyst, i.e., the author of a protocol specification may
freely choose E and S as well as any number of function
symbols F with their arities (disjoint from the above subsets).
Example 1: Consider a protocol with two users a and b, and
where each user a has its own keyring ring(a), and the server
maintains databases of the currently valid keys valid(a) and
revoked keys revoked(a) for a. For such a protocol we define
E = {a, b} and S = {ring(a), valid(a), revoked(a) | a ∈ E}.
We regard all elements of S as constants, despite the
function notation, which is just to ease specification. This
work is currently limited to finite enumerations and finite
sets, as handling infinite domains would require substantial
complications of the approach (e.g., a symbolic representation
or a small system result).
Arbitrary constants are usually denoted by a, b, c, d,
whereas arbitrary variables are denoted by x, y, and z. By
x̄ we denote a finite list x1, . . . , xn of variables.
We furthermore partition Σ into the public symbols (those
symbols that are available to the intruder) and the private
symbols (those that are not). We denote by Σpub and Σpriv the
set of public respectively private symbols. By Cpub and Cpriv
we then denote the sets of public respectively private constants.
The constant attack, the values V, the abstract values A, and
the database constants S are all private.
The set of variables of a term t is denoted by fv(t) and
we say that t is ground iff fv(t) = ∅. Both definitions are
extended to sets of terms as expected.
A substitution is a mapping from variables V to terms. The
substitution domain (or just domain) dom(θ) of a substitution
1These databases are simply sets of messages and we therefore often refer
to them simply as “sets” in this paper.
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θ is defined as the set of those variables that are not mapped
to themselves by θ: dom(θ) ≡ {x ∈ V | θ(x) 6= x}. The
substitution range (or just range) ran(θ) of θ is the image
of the domain of θ under θ: ran(θ) ≡ θ(dom(θ)). For finite
substitutions we use the notation [x1 7→ t1, . . . , xn 7→ tn]
to denote the substitution with domain {x1, . . . , xn} and
range {t1, . . . , tn} that sends each xi to ti. Substitutions are
extended to composed terms homomorphically as expected. A
substitution δ is injective iff δ(x) = δ(y) implies x = y for all
x, y ∈ dom(δ). An interpretation is a substitution I such that
dom(I) = V and ran(I) is ground. A variable renaming ρ is
an injective substitution such that ran(ρ) ⊆ V . An abstraction
substitution is a substitution δ such that ran(δ) ⊆ A.
B. The Intruder Model
We employ the intruder model from [11] which is in the
style of Dolev and Yao: the intruder controls the communica-
tion medium and can encrypt and decrypt with known keys,
but the intruder cannot break cryptography. More formally,
we define that the intruder can derive a message t from a
set of known messages M (the intruder knowledge, or just





M ` t1 · · · M ` tn
M ` f(t1, . . . , tn)
(Compose)
f ∈ Σnpub
M ` t M ` k1 · · · M ` kn
M ` r
(Decompose)
Ana(t) = (K,R), r ∈ R,
K = {k1, . . . , kn}
where Ana(t) = (K,R) is a function that maps a term t to
a pair of sets of terms K and R. We also define a restricted
variant `c of ` as the least relation closed under the (Axiom)
and (Compose) rules only.
The (Axiom) rule simply expresses that all messages di-
rectly known to the intruder are derivable, the (Compose)
rule closes the derivable terms under the application of pub-
lic function symbols such as encryption or public constants
(when f ∈ Σ0pub = Cpub). The (Decompose) rule represents
decomposition operations: Ana(t) = (K,R) means that t is a
term that can be analyzed, provided that the intruder knows
all the “keys” in the set K, and he will then obtain the
“results” in R. This gives us a general way to deal with typical
constructor/destructor theories without needing to work with
algebraic equations and rewriting. We may also write Keys(t)
and Result(t) to denote the set of keys respectively results
from analyzing t, i.e., Ana(t) = (Keys(t),Result(t)).
Example 2: To model asymmetric encryption and signatures
we first fix two public crypt, sign ∈ F2 and one private inv ∈
F1 function symbols. The term crypt(k,m) then denotes the
message m encrypted with a public key k and sign(inv(k),m)
denotes m signed with the private key inv(k) of k. To obtain
a message m encrypted with a public key k the intruder must
produce the private key inv(k) of k. Formally, we define the
analysis rule Anacrypt(x1, x2) = ({inv(x1)}, {x2}). For signa-
tures we define the rule Anasign(x1, x2) = (∅, {x2}) modeling
that the intruder can open any signature that he knows. We
also model a transparent pairing function by fixing pair ∈ Σ2
and defining the rule Anapair(x1, x2) = (∅, {x1, x2}).
Note that we have in this example used a simple notation
for describing Ana(t) for an arbitrary term t: each rule
Anaf (x1, . . . , xn) = (K,R) defines Ana for a constructor
f ∈ Fn. Here xi are distinct variable symbols, and K
and R are sets of terms such that R ⊆ {x1, . . . , xn} and
K ⊆ T (F, {x1, . . . , xn}). Note that for each constructor we
have at most one analysis rule, and for all constructors without
an analysis rule we just have Ana(t) = (∅, ∅). (An example
for the latter is a hash function: the intruder cannot obtain
information from a hash value.)
The reason for this convention is that the formalization
of [11] requires that the Ana function satisfies certain con-
ditions, most notably that it is invariant under substitutions.2
Without going into detail, our notation of the Ana rules
allows for an automated proof that all these requirements are
satisfied. Thus, this allows the user to specify an arbitrary
constructor/destructor theory with these Ana rules without
having to prove anything manually.
C. Typed Model
Our result is based on a typed model in which the intruder is
restricted to only making “well-typed” choices. Many protocol
verification methods [2], [16], [5], [1], [3] rely on such a typed
model since it simplifies the protocol verification problem.
There exist many typing results [17], [12], [18], [19], [20],
[21] that show that a restriction to a typed model is sound for
large classes of protocols. That is, it is without loss of attacks
to restrict the verification to a typed model. Each such result
show that if a protocol satisfies certain syntactic conditions
and is secure in a typed model then the protocol is secure also
in an untyped model. [12] is such a result that is part of the
Isabelle formalization we employ. Since this result has itself
been proved in Isabelle, it is sufficient to obtain the Isabelle
proof of a protocol in the unrestricted model from the Isabelle
proof in the typed model and that the protocol satisfies the
requirements of the typing result. As a minor contribution of
this paper that we just mention here is that we have automated
the Isabelle proof of these requirements of the typing result for
the protocol specification language we present. Thus, all that
is left to do in the following section is the automated proof
for the protocol in the typed model.
In a nutshell, the typing result requires that messages
with different intended meaning cannot be confused for each
other—a condition called type-flaw resistance. More formally,
the typed model is parameterized over a typing function Γ and
a finite set of atomic types Ta satisfying the following:
• Γ(x) ∈ T (Σ \ C,Ta) for x ∈ V (where Ta here acts like
a set of “variables”)
• Γ(c) ∈ Ta for c ∈ C
2One may wonder why we do not allow for analysis rules of the form
Anaf (t1, . . . , tn) = (K,R), where the ti are arbitrary terms instead of just
variables. Because of the substitution invariance requirement from [11] on
Ana such analysis rules would not lead to more expressive Ana functions.
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• Γ(f(t1, . . . , tn)) = f(Γ(t1), . . . ,Γ(tn)) for f ∈ Σ \ C
A substitution θ is then said to be well-typed iff Γ(θ(x)) =
Γ(x) for all variables x. In this paper we use Ta =
{value, enum, settype, attacktype}, and the elements of A ∪
V have type value, the elements of E have type enum,
the elements of S have type settype and attack has type
attacktype. We furthermore assume that all variables that
we use in protocol specifications have atomic types, and we
denote by Va the set of variables with atomic type a (e.g.,
Vvalue is the set of value-typed variables). As an example, let
x, y ∈ Vvalue and a ∈ E, then Γ(sign(inv(x), pair(a, y))) =
sign(inv(value), pair(enum, value)). Suppose an agent expects
to receive a term of this type; then the typed model means
the restriction that the intruder can only send messages of this
type, i.e., he cannot send in place of x and y some terms of a
different type. This restriction of the intruder to typed terms—
which is without loss of generality when the requirements of
the typing result hold—is drastically simplifying the task of
proving the protocol correct.
III. TRANSACTIONS
The Isabelle protocol model of [11] consists of a number
of transactions specifying the behavior of the participants.
A transaction consists of any combination of the following:
input messages to receive, checks on the sets, modifications
of the sets, and output messages to send. A transaction can
only be executed atomically, i.e., it can only fire when input
messages are present, such that the checks are satisfied, and
then they produce all changes and the output messages in one
state transition. Instead of defining a ground state transition
system, [11] considers building symbolic traces as sequences
of transactions with their variables renamed apart, and with
any instantiation of the variables that satisfies the checks and
the intruder model in the sense that the intruder can produce
every input message from previous output messages. (Transac-
tions can also describe additional abilities of the intruder such
as reading a set.) Security goals are formulated by transactions
that check for a situation we consider as a successful attack,
and then reveal the special constant attack to the intruder.
Thus a protocol is safe if no symbolic constraint with the
intruder finally sending attack has a satisfying interpretation.
Note that the length of symbolic traces is finite but unbounded
(i.e., an unbounded session model), and that the number of
enumeration constants and databases currently supported is
arbitrary but fixed in the specification.
For the convenience of an automated verification tool, we
have defined a small language based on transactions with a
bit of syntactic sugar, and this language is directly embedded
into Isabelle. We introduce this language only at hand of a
keyserver example adapted from [11] that we also use as a
running example for the remainder of this paper.
A. A Keyserver Protocol
Before we proceed with the formal definitions we illustrate
our protocol model through the keyserver example. Here users
can register public keys at a trusted keyserver and these keys
can later be revoked. Each user U has an associated keyring
ring(U) with which it keeps track of its keys. (The elements
of ring(U) are actually public keys; we implicitly assume that
the user U knows the corresponding private key.)
First, we model a mechanism outOfBand by which a user U
can register a new key PK at the keyserver out-of-band, e.g.,
by physically visiting the keyserver. The user U first constructs
a fresh public key PK and inserts PK into its keyring ring(U).
We model that the keyserver—in the same transaction—learns
the key and adds it to its database of valid keys for user U ,






Note that there is no built-in notion of set ownership, or who
exactly is performing an action: we just specify with such
transactions what can happen. The intuition is that ring(U)
is a set of public keys controlled by U (and U has the
corresponding private key of each) while valid(U) is controlled
by the server (who is not even given a name here). Putting
it into a single transaction models that this is something
happening in collaboration between a user and a server.
Next, we model a key update mechanism that allows for
registering a new key while simultaneously revoking an old
one. Here we model this as two transactions, one for the user
and one for the server, since here we model a scenario where
user and server communicate via an asynchronous network
controlled by the intruder. To initiate the key revocation
process the user U first picks and removes a key PK from
its keyring to later revoke, then freshly generates a new key
NPK and stores it in its keyring. (Again the corresponding
private key inv(NPK ) is known to U , but this is not explicitly
described.) As a final step the user signs the new key with the
private key inv(PK ) of the old key and sends this signature
to the server by transmitting it over the network:





send sign(inv(PK ), pair(U,NPK )).
The check PK in ring(U) represents here a non-deterministic
choice of an element of ring(U). (Note that a user can register
any number of keys with the outOfBand transaction.) Note
also that we declare PK as a variable of type value, because
PK is not freshly generated; all freshly generated elements,
like NPK here, are automatically of type value.
When the server receives the signed message, it checks that
PK is indeed a valid key, that NPK has not been registered
earlier, and then revokes PK and registers NPK . To keep
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track of revoked keys, the server maintains another database
revoked(U) containing the revoked keys of U :
keyUpdateServer(U: user,PK : value,NPK : value)








As a last action, the old private key inv(PK ) is revealed.
This is of course not what one would do in a reasonable
implementation, but it allows us to prove that the protocol is
correct even if the intruder obtains all private keys to revoked
public keys. (This could also be separated into a rule that just
leaks private keys of revoked keys.)
Actions of the form x notin s(_) for s ∈ Σn are syntactic
sugar for the sequence of actions x notin s(a) for each a ∈ E.
Finally, we define that there is an attack if the intruder learns
a valid key of an honest user. This, again, can be modeled as
a sequence of actions in which we check if the conditions for
an attack holds, and, if so, transmit the constant attack that
acts as a signal for goal violations. Let honest be a subset of
user that contains only the honest agents. Then we define:




The last action attack is just syntactic sugar for send attack.
B. Protocol Model
The keyserver protocol that we just defined consists of
transactions that we now formally define. To keep the formal
definitions simple we omit the variable declarations and the
syntactic sugar employed in our protocol specification lan-
guage. Thus only value-typed variables remain in transactions
since the enumeration variables are resolved as syntactic sugar.
A transaction T is then of the form T = Sr · Sc · F · Su · Ss
where the Si are strands built from the following grammar:
Sr ::= receive t · Sr | 0
Sc ::= x in s · Sc | x notin s · Sc | x 6
.
= x′ · Sc | 0
F ::= new x · F | 0
Su ::= insert x s · Su | delete x s · Su | 0
Ss ::= send u · Ss | 0
where x, x′ ∈ Vvalue, s ∈ S, t ∈ T (E ∪ F,Vvalue), u ∈ T (E ∪
F,Vvalue) ∪ {attack}, and where 0 denotes the empty strand.
The function fv is extended to transactions as expected,
and for a transaction T = Sr · Sc · F · Su · Ss we define
fresh(T ) ≡ fv(F ) (i.e., x ∈ fresh(T ) iff new x occurs in T ).
Protocols are defined as finite sets of such transactions
P = {T1, . . . , Tn}. Their semantics is defined in terms of
a symbolic transition system in which constraints are built
up during transitions. A constraint essentially records what
transactions have been taken, but from the intruder’s point of
view in the sense that the directions of transmitted messages
are swapped (so receives become sends and vice-versa). For
this reason the syntax of constraints A is similar to the syntax
for transactions, but without the new construct:3
A ::= send t · A | receive t · A | t 6 .= t′ · A | insert t t′ · A |
delete t t′ · A | t in t′ · A | t notin t′ · A | 0
where t, t′ ∈ T (Σ,V) and where 0 is the empty constraint.
For the semantics of constraints we define a relation I |=MD
A where A is a constraint, M is the intruder knowledge (the
messages sent so far), D is a set of pairs representing the
current state of the databases (e.g., (k, s) ∈ D iff k is an
element of the database s), and I is an interpretation:
I |=MD 0 iff true
I |=MD send t · A iff M ` I(t) and I |=MD A
I |=MD receive t · A iff I |=
M∪{I(t)}
D A
I |=MD insert t s · A iff I |=MD∪{I((t,s))} A
I |=MD delete t s · A iff I |=MD\{I((t,s))} A
I |=MD t 6
.
= t′ · A iff I(t) 6= I(t′) and I |=MD A
I |=MD t in s · A iff I((t, s)) ∈ D and I |=MD A
I |=MD t notin s · A iff I((t, s)) /∈ D and I |=MD A
We say that I is a model of A, written I |= A, iff I |=∅∅ A.
We may also apply substitutions θ to constraints A, written
θ(A), by extending the definition of substitution application
appropriately. The function fv is also extended to constraints.
We can then define a transition relation ⇒•P for protocols
P in which states are constraints and the initial state is the
empty constraint 0. First, we define the dual of a constraint A,
written dual(A), as “swapping” the direction of the sent and
received messages of A: dual(0) = 0, dual(receive t · A) =
send t · dual(A), dual(send t · A) = receive t · dual(A), and
dual(a · A) = a · dual(A) otherwise. The transition
A ⇒•P A · dual(ρ(σ(Sr · Sc · Su · Ss)))
is then applicable for a transaction T ∈ P if the following
conditions are met:
1) T = Sr · Sc · F · Su · Ss for some F ,
2) σ is a substitution mapping fresh(T ) to fresh values (i.e.,
dom(σ) = fresh(T ), ran(σ) ⊆ V, and the elements of
ran(σ) do not occur in A), and
3) ρ is a variable renaming sending the variables of T to new
variables that do not occur in A or P (that is, dom(ρ) =
fv(T ) and (fv(A) ∪ fv(P)) ∩ ran(ρ) = ∅).
A constraint A is said to be reachable in P iff 0 ⇒•?P A
where ⇒•?P denotes the transitive reflexive closure of ⇒•P .
The protocol then has an attack iff there exists a reachable
and satisfiable constraint where the intruder can produce the
3When building up constraints during transitions the variables x occurring
in new x actions will be instantiated with fresh values. Hence, new x actions
will never occur in constraints. For the same reason the constraint syntax
needs to be slightly more flexible compared to the transaction syntax, so as
to allow for actions such as insert t s where t /∈ V .
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attack signal, i.e., there exists a reachable A in P and an
interpretation I such that I |= A · send attack. If P does not
have an attack then P is secure.
C. Well-Formedness
We are going to employ the abstraction-based verification
technique from [14] in the following to automatically generate
security proofs. The technique has a few more requirements
in order to work and which we bundle in a notion of well-
formedness.
First, when a transaction uses a variable when sending a
message or performing a set update, then that variable must
either be fresh or have occurred positively in a received
message or check. Intuitively, transactions cannot produce a
value “out of the blue”, but the value either has to exist before
the transaction (in some message or set) or is created by the
transaction. Formally, let T = Sr · Sc · F · Su · Ss , then we
require:
C1: fv(Su) ∪ fv(Ss) ⊆ fv(Sr ) ∪ fv(Sc) ∪ fresh(T )
C2: fresh(T ) ∩ (fv(Sr ) ∪ fv(Sc)) = ∅
(The second condition simply states that values that are freshly
generated by a transaction T should not also occur in the
received messages and the checks of T .)
The abstraction approach that we employ, furthermore,
would not work if, e.g., an agent freshly creates a value
and stores it in a set, but never sends it out as part of a
message. This is because the abstraction discards the explicit
representation of sets, and just keeps the abstracted messages.
An easy workaround is to define a special private unary func-
tion symbol occurs and augment every rule containing action
new x with the action send occurs(x); and we augment every
transaction where variable x occurs but is not freshly generated
with receive occurs(x). In order not to bother the user with
this, our tool can make this transformation automatically.
This addition of occurs has, however, a subtle consequence.
Suppose a specification contains no transaction that generates




This rule cannot fire after the occurs transformation, because
it adds the requirement to receive occurs(PK ) which nobody
can produce. One would, however, naturally expect that said
protocol is not secure. Thus, we require (and automatically
check) that each protocol specification includes a value-
producing transaction, i.e., a transaction that is applicable in
every state and generates a fresh value.
One may wonder in the above example why the intruder is
not able to provide the value, since he has an unlimited supply
of constants of every type, including type value. However,
for such a constant c he does not have occurs(c) (because it
is not fresh and occurs is private) and thus cannot use it in
any transaction. Thus, we have a model where the intruder
by default cannot generate fresh values, and it is thus the
design choice of the user to define a transaction that allows
the intruder to generate fresh values, if this is desired. This is
in our opinion more flexible than a fixed intruder rule, since
the rule can be adapted to the context of a particular model.
For instance, in the keyserver example where values represent
public keys one may define the intruder rule that gives also







Finally, a small technical difficulty arises when a transaction
has two variables x, y that could be the same value, i.e., that
allows for a model I with I(x) = I(y). This is difficult to
handle in the verification since the transaction may require
to insert x into a set and delete y from that very set. To
steer clear of this, the paper [14] simply defines the semantics
to be injective on variables. For user-friendliness we do not
want to follow this, and rather do the following: for any rule
with variables x and y that are not part of a new construct,
we generate a variant of the rule where we unify x and y,
checking whether this gives a consistent transaction. If so, we
add it to the rule system. Then we add the constraint x 6 .= y
to the original rule. We do that until all rules have x 6 .= y
for all pairs of variables that are not freshly generated. For
instance, in the keyserver example, we have only one rule to
look at: keyUpdateServer with variables PK and NPK . Since
unifying PK and NPK gives an unsatisfiable rule, it is safe
to add PK 6 .= NPK to it.
IV. SET-BASED ABSTRACTION
We now come to the core of our approach: for a given
protocol, how to automatically verify and generate a security
proof that Isabelle can accept. As explained earlier this is
based on an abstract interpretation method called set-based
abstraction [22], [13], [14]. Of course this approach is rather
complicated and lengthy when explained in all detail, and
even more so is the contribution of the present paper, i.e.,
the Isabelle machinery and proofs building on this idea. Thus,
the following explanations can only summarize the approach,
leaving out many details (especially ones published in existing
works), and can give the reader only an idea. We therefore
emphasize again that the final Isabelle-accepted proofs do not
depend on the correctness of this machinery we sketch in the
following: the machinery is just to provide a proof that Isabelle
can check, and an error in this machinery (or an attack in the
protocol) only leads to failure to prove it in Isabelle.
Recall that in the previous section we formalized a pro-
tocol model by reachable constraints A (i.e., a sequence of
transactions where variables have been named apart and the
send/receive direction has been swapped in order to express
it from the intruder’s point of view) with their satisfying
interpretations I |= A. Note that |= is defined via a relation
|=MD , representing the intruder knowledge—all the messages
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received so far—and the state of the sets S—all values
inserted into a set that were not deleted so far. We could thus
characterize the “state” of the entire system after a number of
instantiated transactions by these two items, M and D.
Example 3: In our keyserver example the following in-
stantiated constraint is possible (after taking a transition with







receive sign(inv(pk1), pair(a, pk2))
After this trace we have
M = {pk1, sign(inv(pk1), pair(a, pk2))}, and
D = {(pk1, valid(a)), (pk2, ring(a))}.
The idea is that the abstract representation replaces each
concrete value of V with a constant from A that represents
the set memberships. For this reason, we choose A to be
isomorphic to the power set of S, i.e., for every subset of
S, we have a corresponding constant in A. We write A for the
abstract value that corresponds to the subset A of S, e.g., if
s1, s2 ∈ S then {s1, s2} ∈ A.
Thus, given a state D of the databases we define an
abstraction function from V to A as follows:
αD(c) = {s | (c, s) ∈ D}
and we extend it to terms and sets of terms as expected.
Example 4: In the previous example we have αD(pk1) =
{valid(a)} and αD(pk2) = {ring(a)}. Thus αD(M) =
{{valid(a)}, sign(inv({valid(a)}), pair(a, {ring(a)}))}.
The key idea is to compute the fixed point of all the abstract
messages that the intruder can obtain in any model of any
reachable constraint. Note that this fixed point is in general
infinite, even if S is finite (and thus so is A), because the
intruder can compose arbitrarily complex messages and send
them. This is why tools like [22], [13], [14] do not directly
compute it but represent it by a set of Horn clauses and check
using resolution whether attack is derivable.
However, remember that we can restrict ourselves to the
typed model and use the typing result of [12] to infer the
security proof without the typing restriction. All variables
that occur in a constraint are of type value (the parameter
variables of the transactions are de-sugared) and thus, in a
typed model it holds that I(x) ∈ V for every variable x and
well-typed interpretation I. While V is still countably infinite,
the abstraction (in any state D) maps to the finite A. Thus the
fixed point is always finite in a typed model.
There is a subtle point here: even though we limit the
variables to well-typed terms, and thus all messages that can
ever be sent or received, the Dolev-Yao closure is still infinite,
i.e., for a (finite) set M of messages there are still infinitely
many t such that M ` t. Only finitely many of these t can be
sent by the intruder in the typed model, but one may wonder
if the entire derivation relation ` can be limited to “well-
typed” terms without losing attacks. Indeed, we define well-
typed terms as the set of terms that includes all well-typed
instances of sent and received messages in transactions, and
that is closed under subterms and Keys. We have now proved
in Isabelle that for the intruder to derive any well-typed term,
it is sound to also limit the intruder deduction to well-typed
terms, so no ill-typed intermediate terms are needed during the
derivation. (This is indeed very similar to some lemmas we
have proved for parallel compositionality, namely for so-called
homogeneous terms the deduction does not need to consider
any inhomogeneous terms [11].) Thus, it is sufficient to limit
the fixed point, including intruder deduction, to well-typed
terms, and thus have a finite fixed point.
A. Term Implication
Let us now see in more detail how to compute the fixed
point. An important aspect of the abstraction approach is that
the global state is mutable, i.e., the set membership of concrete
values can change over transitions, and so their abstraction
changes. For this we have the notion of a term implication:
Definition 1: A term implication (a, b) is a pair of abstract
values a, b ∈ A and a term implication graph TI is a binary
relation between abstract values, i.e., TI ⊆ A×A. Instead of
(a, b) ∈ TI we may also write a→ b.
The reason we use the word “implication” is as follows. An
abstract value a ∈ A in general represents a multitude of
concrete values c1, c2, . . . ∈ V; when a concrete value c1
changes its set memberships, then its abstraction changes, say
to b ∈ A; however, the other concrete values c2, . . . ∈ V that
had the same abstraction before this change do not necessarily
change their set memberships. Thus for an abstract message
like f(a) that contains the abstract value a, this a could
either represent the concrete value c1 that changes its set-
membership, i.e., produce f(b), or it could represent one of
the other concrete values c2, . . . and thus f(a) would be the
abstract message after the change. The abstraction must thus
include both: every term implication a → b means that for
every fact f(a) we additionally have f(b). Note that in case of
several occurrences, e.g., f(a, a), we have additionally f(a, b),
f(b, a), and f(b, b), since each occurrence of a could represent
a different concrete value. This is captured by the following
definitions:
Definition 2 (Term transformation): Let (a, b) be a term
implication. The term transformation under (a, b) is the least
relation a→ b closed under the following rules:
x a→ b x x ∈ V a a→ b b
t1 a→ b s1 · · · tn a→ b sn
f(t1, . . . , tn) a→ b f(s1, . . . , sn)
f ∈ Σn
Note that this relation is also reflexive since a a→ b a follows
from a ∈ Σ0. If t a→ b t′ then we say that t′ is implied by t
under (a, b), or just t′ is implied by t for short.
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Definition 3 (Term implication closure): Let TI be a term
implication graph and let t be a term. The term implication
closure of t under TI is defined as the least set clTI (t) closed
under the following rules:
t ∈ clTI (t)
t′ ∈ clTI (t)
t′′ ∈ clTI (t)
(a→ b) ∈ TI ,
t′ a→ b t′′
This definition is extended to sets of terms M as expected. If
t′ ∈ clTI (t) then we say that t′ is implied by t (under TI ).
The idea is that the fixed point should ultimately be closed
under the term implication graph. However, this closure is
actually quite large in many practical examples, and thus
we just record the messages that are ever received by the
intruder together with the term implication graph, but without
performing this closure explicitly:
Definition 4: A protocol fixed-point candidate, or fixed point
for short,4 is a pair (FP ,TI ) such that
1) FP is a finite and ground set of terms over T (Σ \V, ∅).
2) TI is a term implication graph: TI ⊆ A× A.
B. Limitations
There are some limitations of our approach that we now
mention. First, we inherit the free algebra term model
from [11] (two terms are equal iff they are syntactically equal)
and so we do not support algebraic properties such as needed
for Diffie-Hellman. Secondly, we inherit the limitations of
AIF’s set-based abstraction approach:
• We require each protocol to have a fixed and finite
number of enumeration constants and sets. This typically
means that also the number of agents is fixed—at least
if the protocol has to specify a number of sets for each
agent.
• We require that the sets can only contain values. The
reason is to allow these values to be abstracted by set
membership.
• We cannot refer directly to particular constants of type
value. This would not be very useful as every value with
the same set-membership status are identified with the
same abstract value under the set-based abstraction.
Our approach allows for an unbounded number of sessions.
The only difference here between our work and e.g. Tamarin
[10] and ProVerif [23] is that we need, as mentioned, to fix the
number of enumeration constants and sets, and thereby, in a
typical specification, also fix the number of agents. However,
there is no difference in the notion of unbounded sessions: We
allow for an unbounded number of transitions, every set can
contain an unbounded number of values, and the intruder can
make an unbounded number of steps.
Because we use the typing result from [12], we also
require that protocols have to satisfy the type-flaw resistance
requirements of that result. These requirements are a general-
ization of the common tagging mechanisms which should in
4Here “candidate” is to emphasize that this is just a proof idea that has yet
to be verified by Isabelle.
many applications not be a practical limitation. Note that this
requirement is checked automatically.
Finally, we do not directly support private channels, but
one can instead send messages under a private function. For
instance, one can write in a transaction send privChan(A,B, t)
where A and B are of type enum and t is a message. Such
communication is asynchronous. One can model synchronous
communication only in a limited way here through sets, e.g.,
as insert Nonce privCh(A,B).
C. Example of a Fixed-Point Computation
Consider again the keyserver protocol defined in Subsec-
tion III-A; for simplicity we do this example for just one user
a who is also honest: user = honest = {a}. We show how the
fixed point (or rather the candidate that we then check with
Isabelle) is computed; to make it more readable, let us give
the fixed point right away and then see how each element is
derived: FPks ≡ (FPks ,TI ks) where
FPks ≡ { {ring(a), valid(a)}, {ring(a)}, inv({revoked(a)}),
sign(inv({valid(a)}), pair(a, {ring(a)}))
sign(inv(∅), pair(a, {ring(a)})) }
and where the term implication graph TI ks can be represented
graphically as follows where each edge a→ b corresponds to




Note that we can actually reduce the representation of the
fixed point a little bit as we do not need to include facts that
can be obtained via term implication from others; with this
optimization we obtain actually:
FP ′ks ≡ { sign(inv(∅), pair(a, {ring(a)})),
{ring(a)}, inv({revoked(a)}) }
To compute this, we first consider the transaction
outOfBand where a fresh key is inserted into both ring(a)
and valid(a) and sent out. The abstraction of this key is thus
the value {ring(a), valid(a)}. This value is in the intruder
knowledge in FPks but redundant due to other messages we
derive later).5 Note that this rule cannot produce anything else
so we do not consider it for the remainder.
Next let us look at the transaction keyUpdateUser. For
keyUpdateUser we need to choose an abstract value for PK
that satisfies the check PK in ring(a). At this point in
the fixed-point computation we have only {ring(a), valid(a)}.
Since the transaction removes the key PK from ring(a), we
get the term implication {ring(a), valid(a)} → {valid(a)}.
A fresh value NPK is also generated and inserted into
ring(a), and a signed message is sent out which gives us:
sign(inv({valid(a)}), pair(a, {ring(a)})). Also, this one is a
5In fact, the well-formedness conditions of the previous section require to
also include occurs facts, but for illustration, we have simply omitted them
(as the intruder knows every public key that occurs).
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message that later becomes redundant with further messages.
By analysis, the intruder also obtains {ring(a)}.
The new value {ring(a)} allows for another application of
the keyUpdateUser rule, namely with this key in the role of
PK . This now gives the term implication {ring(a)} → ∅ and
the message sign(inv(∅), pair(a, {ring(a)})). After this, there
are no further ways to apply this transaction rule, because we
will not get to any other abstract value that contains ring(a).
Applying the keyUpdateServer transaction to the first sig-
nature we have obtained (i.e., with PK = {valid(a)} and
NPK = {ring(a)}), we get the term implications {valid(a)}
→ {revoked(a)} and {ring(a)} → {ring(a), valid(a)}, and
the intruder learns inv({revoked(a)}). Applying it with the
second signature (i.e., with PK = ∅ and NPK as before), we
get additionally the term implication ∅ → {valid(a)}. Note
that we must also check if the intruder can generate a signature
that works with keyUpdateServer: however, the only private
keys he knows are those represented by inv({revoked(a)})
and they are not accepted for this transaction. (In a model with
dishonest agents, the intruder can of course produce signatures
with keys registered to a dishonest agent name, but here we
have just one honest user a.)
No other transaction can produce anything we do not have
in FPks already—in particular we cannot apply the attack
transaction and this concludes the fixed-point computation.
Thus—according to our abstract interpretation analysis—the
protocol is indeed secure. Next we try to convince Isabelle.
V. CHECKING FIXED-POINT COVERAGE
A major contribution of this work is now to use the
fixed point that was automatically computed by the abstract
interpretation approach as a “proof idea” for conducting the
security proof in Isabelle on the concrete protocol. Essentially,
we prove that the fixed point indeed “covers” everything that
can happen. We break this down into an induction proof: given
any trace that is covered by the fixed point, if we extended
it by any applicable transition, then the resulting trace is also
covered by the fixed point. This induction step we break down
into a number of checks that are directly executable within
Isabelle using the built-in term rewriting proof method code-
simp. We have also proved some protocol-independent Isabelle
theorems that show that any protocol that passes said checks
is indeed correct. Note that these checks are not only fully
automated, but they are also terminating in all but a few
degenerate cases.6
Term rewriting within Isabelle benefits from the exact same
correctness guarantees as the rest of Isabelle since every
rewriting step is verified by the system. This, of course, also
6It is technically possible to specify protocols for which the checks do
not terminate. For instance, an analysis rule of the form Anaf (x) =
({f(f(x))}, R), for some f , x and R, would lead to termination issues when
automatically proving the conditions for the typing result which we rely on,
because we here need to compute a set that contains the terms occurring in
the protocol specification and is closed under keys needed for analysis, and
such a set would in this case be infinite. However, this is an artificial example
that normally does not occur since it is usually the case that keys cannot
themselves be analyzed.
means that evaluation through the built-in term rewriting proof
methods can be several orders of magnitudes slower than
executing a program since every application of a rewrite rule
is checked by Isabelle’s core inference system. Fortunately,
Isabelle provides a means of evaluating terms through code
generation using, e.g., the built-in proof method eval. This
allows us to offer a trade-off to our users: one can use either
code-simp for the overwhelming assurance of Isabelle proofs,
or one can use eval to get the full speed of running code
outside of Isabelle but with the disadvantage of having to trust
in the correctness of the code generation infrastructure. For
instance, one could use eval during development of a protocol
specification and only use code-simp as a final step to get a
fully Isabelle-verified proof of security.
A. Automatically Checking for Fixed-Point Coverage
Let us look at how we can automatically check if a fixed-
point covers a protocol. We first explain how this works in
general and thereafter give an example, in Example 5, of how
it works using the keyserver example.
A transaction of the protocol after resolving all the sugar
has only variables of type value. Thus, in a typed model and
under the abstraction, we can instantiate the variables only
with abstract values, i.e., elements from A. We first define
what it means that a transaction is applicable under such a
substitution of the variables with respect to the fixed point
computed by the abstract interpretation:
Definition 5 (Fixed-point coverage: pre-conditions): Let
T = Sr ·Sc ·F ·Su ·Ss be a transaction and let FP = (FP ,TI )
be a fixed point. Let further δ be an abstraction substitution
mapping the variables of T to abstract values of A. We say
that δ satisfies the pre-conditions (for T and FP), written
pre(FP, δ, T ), iff the following conditions are met:
F1. clTI (FP) ` δ(t) for all receive t occurring in Sr
F2. s ∈ δ(x) for all x in s occurring in Sc
F3. s /∈ δ(x) for all x notin s occurring in Sc
F4. δ(x) = ∅ for all x ∈ fresh(T )
(We write here s ∈ δ(x) as a short-hand for s ∈ A for the set
A such that δ(x) = A. s /∈ δ(x) is defined similarly.) Here, F1
checks that the intruder can produce all input messages for the
transaction under the given δ. Note that the intruder has control
over the entire network, so he can use here any message
honest agents have sent and also construct other messages
from that knowledge (hence the `). Moreover, we consider
here the closure of the intruder knowledge FP under the
term implication rules, since that represents all variants of the
messages that are available to the intruder; we will later show
as an optimization that we can check whether clTI (FP) ` δ(t)
holds without first explicitly computing clTI (FP). The next
checks F2 and F3 are that all set membership conditions are
satisfied, and F4 checks that all fresh variables represent values
that are not member of any set.
Now for every δ under which the transaction T can be
applied (according to FP), we compute what T can “produce”
and that that is also covered by FP. What the transaction can
produce are the outgoing messages and the changes in set
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memberships. The latter is captured by an updated abstraction
substitution δu that is identical with δ except for those values
that changed their set memberships during the transaction:
Definition 6 (Abstraction substitution update): Let T = Sr ·
Sc ·F ·Su ·Ss be a transaction and δ an abstraction substitution.
We define the update of δ w.r.t. T , written δu, as follows:
δu(x) ≡ upd(Su , x, δ(x)), where
upd(0, x, a) = a
upd(t.S, x, a) =

upd(S, x, a ∪ {s}) if t = insert(x, s)
upd(S, x, a \ {s}) if t = delete(x, s)
upd(S, x, a) otherwise
Note that according to this definition, if a transaction contains
insert and delete operations of the same value x for the same
set, then “the last one counts”. But there is a more subtle point:
suppose the transaction includes the operations insert(x, s)
and delete(y, s). The above definition would not necessarily
formalize the updates of the set memberships if the transaction
were applicable (in the concrete) under an interpretation I
with I(x) = I(y). Note that for this very reason the concrete
semantics requires I to be injective, and, as explained earlier
in Subsection III-C, we automatically achieve this through
appropriate syntactic sugar so as to not bother the user.
Based on this update, we can now define what it means for
a transaction to be covered by a fixed point:
Definition 7 (Fixed-point coverage: post-conditions): Let
T = Sr ·Sc ·F ·Su ·Ss be a transaction and let FP = (FP ,TI )
be a fixed point. Let δ be an abstraction substitution and δu
the update of δ w.r.t. T . We say that δ satisfies the post-
conditions (for T and FP), written post(FP, δ, T ), iff the
following conditions are met:
G1. (δ(x)→ δu(x)) ∈ TI ∗ for all x ∈ fv(T ) \ fresh(T )
G2. clTI (FP) ` δu(t) for all send t occurring in Ss
Here G1 expresses that every update of a value must be a
path in the term implication graph (it does not need to be a
single edge). G2 means that the intruder learns every outgoing
message δu(t) and thus it must be covered by the fixed point
when closed under term implication.
We can now put it all together: for the pre-conditions we are
restricting the coverage check to those abstraction substitutions
that are actually possible in the fixed point. For the post-
conditions we are then checking that the fixed point covers
everything that the transaction produces under those same
substitutions: fixed-point coverage is thus defined as follows:
Definition 8 (Fixed-point coverage): Let T be a transaction
and let FP = (FP ,TI ) be a fixed point. We say that FP
covers T iff for all abstraction substitutions δ with domain
fv(T ), if pre(FP, T, δ) then post(FP, T, δ). For a protocol P
we say that FP covers P iff FP covers all transactions of P .
With this defined we can prove the following theorem:
Theorem 1: 7 Let P be a protocol and let FP be a fixed
point. If attack does not occur in FP, and if P is covered by
FP, then P is secure.
7This theorem is called protocol_secure in the Isabelle code and can
be found in the Stateful_Protocol_Verification.thy theory file.
Example 5: Consider the key update transaction
keyUpdateServer from Subsection III-A. We now show
that the fixed point FPks defined in Example IV-C covers this
transaction, i.e., satisfies Definition 8.
The only variables occurring in keyUpdateServer are PK
and NPK , so we can begin by finding the abstraction substitu-
tions with domain {PK ,NPK} that satisfy the pre-conditions
given in Definition 5. We denote by ∆ the set of those
substitutions. Afterwards we show that all δ ∈ ∆ satisfy the
post-conditions given in Definition 7.
The variables PK and NPK are not declared as fresh
in keyUpdateServer so condition F4 is vacuously satisfied.
From F2 and F3 we know that valid(a) ∈ δ(PK ) and
valid(a), revoked(a) /∈ δ(NPK ), for all δ ∈ ∆. From F1 we
know that clTI ks (FPks) ` δ(sign(inv(PK ), pair(a,NPK ))).
The intruder cannot compose the signature himself since he
cannot derive a private key of the form inv(b) where b ∈ A
and valid(a) ∈ b. Hence the only signatures available to
him—that also satisfy the constraints for ∆ that we have
deduced so far—are sign(inv({valid(a)}), pair(a, b)) for each
b ∈ {{ring(a)}, ∅}. The only surviving substitutions are
δ1 = [PK 7→ {valid(a)},NPK 7→ ∅], and
δ2 = [PK 7→ {valid(a)},NPK 7→ {ring(a)}].
That is, ∆ = {δ1, δ2}.
Next, we compute the updated substitutions w.r.t. the trans-
action keyUpdateServer:
δ1u = [PK 7→ {revoked(a)},NPK 7→ {valid(a)}], and
δ2u = [PK 7→ {revoked(a)},NPK 7→ {ring(a), valid(a)}].
Now we can verify that conditions G1 and G2 hold for δ1 and
δ2: We have that δi(x) → δiu(x) is covered by TI ks , for all
i ∈ {1, 2} and all x ∈ {PK ,NPK}. We also have that the
outgoing message inv(PK ) is in clTI ks (FPks) under each δ
i
u.
Thus keyUpdateServer is covered by FPks .
We can, in a similar fashion, verify that the remaining
transactions of the keyserver protocol are covered by the fixed
point. Thus the keyserver protocol is covered by FPks .
B. Automatic Fixed-Point Computation
An interesting consequence of the coverage check is that we
can also use it to compute a fixed point for protocols P . In a
nutshell, we can update a given a fixed-point candidate FP0
for P as follows: For each transaction of P we first compute
the abstraction substitutions ∆ that satisfy the pre-conditions
F1 to F4. Secondly, we use the post-conditions G1 and G2
to compute the result of taking T under each δ ∈ ∆ and add
those terms and term implications to FP0. Starting from an
empty initial iterand (∅, ∅) we can then iteratively compute
a fixed point for P . Definition 9 gives a simple method to
compute protocol fixed points based on this idea.
Definition 9: Let P be a protocol and let f be the function
defined as follows:
f((FP ,TI )) ≡ (FP ∪ {t ∈ F̂PTδ | T ∈ P, δ ∈ ∆TFP,TI },
TI ∪ {ab ∈ T̂I Tδ | T ∈ P, δ ∈ ∆TFP,TI })
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where
∆TFP,TI ≡ {δ | dom(δ) = fv(T ), pre((FP ,TI ), T, δ)}
F̂PTδ ≡ {δu(t) | send t occurs in T}
T̂I Tδ ≡ {(δ(x), δu(x)) | x ∈ fv(T ) \ fresh(T )}
Then we can compute a fixed point for P by computing a
fixed point of f , e.g., by computing the least n ∈ N such that
fn((∅, ∅)) = fn+1((∅, ∅)).
We provide, as part of our Isabelle formalization, a function
to compute such a fixed point (with some optimizations to
avoid computing terms and term implications that are sub-
sumed by the remaining fixed point), using the built-in code
generation functionality of Isabelle.
VI. IMPROVING THE COVERAGE CHECK
We now describe a number of improvements that are
essential to an efficient check (small experiments show that
without these, performance is quite poor even in minimal
examples). We emphasize again that even if we had introduced
mistakes here, it would not affect the correctness of the entire
approach, since in the worst case the proofs would be rejected
by Isabelle.
There are two major issues that make the coverage check
from the previous section quite inefficient when implemented
directly. One concerns the fact that the fixed point should be
considered closed under intruder deduction and term impli-
cation. Even though the typed model allows us to keep even
the intruder deduction closure finite, explicitly computing the
closure is not feasible even on rather modest examples. The
second issue is about the abstraction substitutions δ of the
check: recall that in the check we defined above, for a given
transaction we consider every substitution δ of the variables
with abstract values, which is of course exponential both in
the number of variables and the number of sets.
Let us first deal with this second issue. We can indeed
compute exactly those substitutions that satisfy conditions
F2 to F4: every positive set-membership check x in s of
the transaction requires that s ∈ δ(x), and similarly for
the negative case. Moreover, δ(x) can be only an abstract
value that actually occurs in the fixed point. Starting from
these constraints often substantially cuts down the number of
substitutions δ that we need to consider in the check, especially
when we have more agents than in the example. This is
because typically (at least in a good protocol) most values will
not be members of many sets that belong to different agents
(but rather just a few that deal with that particular value).
The first issue, i.e., avoiding computing the term implication
closure clTI (FP) when performing intruder deductions, is
more difficult. The majority of this section is therefore dedi-
cated to improving on conditions F1 and G2 so that we can
avoid computing the entire closure clTI (FP)—only in a few
corner cases, we need to compute the closure for a few terms
of FP . A key to that is to saturate the intruder knowledge
with terms that can be obtained by analysis and then work
with composition only, i.e., `c.
A. Intruder Deduction Modulo Term Implications
Recall that `c is the intruder deduction without analysis,
i.e., only the (Axiom) and (Compose) rules. We first consider
how we can handle in this restricted deduction relation the
term implication graph TI efficiently, i.e., how to decide
clTI (M) `c t (for given TI , M and t) without computing
clTI (M). In a second step we then show how to handle also
analysis, i.e., the full ` relation.
In fact it boils down to checking the side condition of
(Axiom), i.e., in our case, whether t ∈ clTI (M), without hav-
ing to compute clTI (M) first. (The composition rule is then
easier because it does not “directly look” at the knowledge.)
For this, it is sufficient if we can check whether t ∈ clTI (t′)
for any t′ ∈M , without having to compute clTI (t′).
Consider again Definition 3. We can use this to derive a re-
cursive check function t′  TI t for the question t ∈ clTI (t′):
it can only hold if either
• t and t′ are the same variable,
• or t, t′ are abstract values with a path from t′ to t in TI ,
• or t = f(t1, . . . , tn) and t′ = f(t′1, . . . , t
′
n), where
recursively t′i  TI ti holds for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
With this we can now define a recursive function c that
checks for given M , TI , and t whether clTI (M) `c t without
computing clTI (M), defined as follows:
M TIc t iff (∃t′ ∈M. t′  TI t) or
t is of the form t = f(t1, . . . , tn) where
f ∈ Σnpub and M TIc ti for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
This function indeed fulfills its purpose:
Lemma 1: clTI (M) `c t iff M TIc t
Next, we show how to reduce the intruder deduction prob-
lem ` to the restricted variant `c.
B. Analyzed Intruder Knowledge
The idea is now that `c is actually already sufficient, if
we have an analyzed intruder knowledge: we define that a
knowledge M is analyzed iff M ` t implies M `c t for
all t. More in detail, we can consider a knowledge M that is
saturated by adding all subterms of M that can be obtained by
analysis. Then M is analyzed, i.e., we do not need any further
analysis steps in the intruder deduction. This is intuitively the
case because the intruder cannot learn anything from analyzing
messages he has composed himself.
We now define formally what if means for a term t to be
analyzed using the keys (Keys(t)) and results (Result(t)) from
the analysis as defined in Subsection II-B:
Definition 10 (Analyzed term): Let M be a set of terms
and let t be a term. We then say that t is analyzed in M iff
M `c Keys(t) implies M `c Result(t) (where M `c N for
sets of terms M and N is a short-hand for ∀t ∈ N. M `c t).
The following lemma then provides us with a decision
procedure for determining if a knowledge is analyzed:
Lemma 2: M is analyzed iff all t ∈M are analyzed in M .
We now consider again an intruder knowledge given as the
term implication closure of a set of messages, i.e., clTI (M)
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instead of M . Efficiently checking whether an intruder knowl-
edge’s term implication closure is analyzed, without actually
computing it, is challenging. The following lemma shows that
if we can derive the results of analyzing a term t in the
knowledge M then we can also derive the results of analyzing
any implied term t′ ∈ clTI (t):
Lemma 3: Let t ∈M . If clTI (M) `c Result(t) then for all
t′ ∈ clTI (t), clTI (M) `c Result(t′).
Therefore, if all k ∈ Keys(t) can be derived and t is analyzed
in clTI (M) then we can conclude that all implied terms t′ ∈
clTI (t) are analyzed in clTI (M). If, however, some of the
keys for t are not derivable then we are forced to check the
implied terms as well as the following example shows:
Example 6: Let f, g ∈ Σ1priv , TI = {a → b}, and
M = {f(a), g(b)}. Define the analysis rules Anaf (x) =
({g(x)}, {x}) and Anag(x) = (∅, ∅). Then clTI (M) =
{f(b)} ∪M . The term f(a) is analyzed in clTI (M) because
the key g(a) cannot be derived: clTI (M) 6`c g(a). However,
f(a) a→ b f(b) and f(b) is not analyzed in clTI (M):
Ana(f(b)) = ({g(b)}, {b}) but the key g(b) is derivable from
clTI (M) in `c whereas the result b is not. Thus clTI (M) is
not an analyzed knowledge.
So in most cases we can efficiently check if clTI (M) is
analyzed, and in some cases we need to also compute the
term implication closure clTI (t) of problematic terms t ∈M
(but not necessarily compute all of clTI (M)):
Lemma 4: clTI (M) is analyzed iff for all t ∈ M , the
following holds
if clTI (M) `c Keys(t) then t is analyzed in clTI (M)
else all t′ ∈ clTI (t) are analyzed in clTI (M).
This lemma also provides us with the means to extend a
knowledge M to one whose term implication closure is ana-
lyzed: The idea is to close M under the rule that extends it with
the result Result(t) of those analyzable terms t ∈M for which
the conditions on the right-hand side of the biconditional in
Lemma 4 fails. For instance, in Example 6 we need to extend
M = {f(a), g(b)} with b, resulting in the analyzed knowledge
M ′ = {f(a), g(b), b}.
VII. PROOF OF CONCEPT
Table I shows the fixed-point sizes of various example
protocols together with measurements of the elapsed real time
it takes to generate and verify the Isabelle specifications. First,
we report the time for translating the protocol specifications
into Isabelle/HOL (Translation), the time for showing that the
given protocol is an instance of the formal protocol model
(Setup), and the time for computing the fixed-point and its
size. In the last three columns, we report the run-time of
three different strategies for the security proof: Safe employs
symbolic evaluation using Isabelle’s simplifier code-simp. In
this configuration, all proof steps are checked by Isabelle’s
LCF-style kernel. NBE employs normalization by evaluation,
a technique that uses a partially symbolic evaluation approach
that, to a limited extend, relies on Isabelle’s code generator.
Finally, Unsafe is an approach that directly employs the code
generator and internally uses the proof method eval. In general,
the configurations NBE and Unsafe require the user to trust the
code generator. While Isabelle’s code generator is thoroughly
tested, it is not formally verified. We mainly provide these
configurations to provide faster alternatives during interactive
protocol explorations. Ultimately, it is up to the user to decide
which approach to use, preferably after consulting [24], which
discusses the software stack that needs to be trusted in each
of these configurations in more detail.
All experiments have been conducted on a Linux server
with an Intel Xeon E5-2680 CPU and 256GB main memory.
Our implementation provides an option to measure the time
required for executing individual “top-level” commands (e.g.,
protocol_security_proof). We only report the times
that are specific to the individual protocols using a “pre-
compiled” session that contains our generic protocol translator
as well as the protocol-independent formalizations and proofs.
Compiling this session takes ca. 4 minutes and 30 seconds.
The example Keyserver_h_d is our running keyserver ex-
ample for h honest agents and d dishonest agents.8 The exam-
ple Keyserver_Composition_h_d with h honest agents and d
dishonest agents is inspired by [11] where another keyserver
protocol—named Keyserver2_h_d here—runs in parallel on
the same network and where databases are shared between
the protocols.
We made further experiments where our focus is not the
precise modeling and verification of particular protocols, but
rather to experiment with our method on more complex
examples and get an understanding of how our method scales.
With TLS12simp we have looked at one practical protocol,
TLS 1.2, with two honest agent and one dishonest agent, albeit
with some simplifications, in particular modeling only one
variant of the flow and simplifying the hashing.
NSLclassic and NSPKclassic are based on the NSL and
Needham–Schroeder protocol specifications shipped with AIF-
ω [14].
Finally, scenario 3 and 7 (PKCS#11_3 and PKCS#11_7),
from the “PKCS#11” model that is distributed with AIF-ω [14]
are examples of another flavor of stateful protocols, namely
security tokens that can store keys and perform encryption and
decryption and with which the intruder can interact through
an API. Generally modeling such tokens and their APIs works
quite well with the set-based abstraction. We report only two
scenarios as they are the only ones that do not lead to an
attack. In fact there is a third one (scenario #9) that is marked
as correct in the AIF-ω distribution, but that is actually due to
a mistake that our attempt to verify it in Isabelle has revealed.
We discuss this example in more detail in the appendix. This
illustrates our main point that there can be surprises when one
tries to verify in Isabelle the results of automated tools.
8We verify here a generalized version of the keyserver example (as
compared to the running example): we include dishonest agents who can
participate in the protocol. This also requires that agents maintain a set of
deleted keys, because otherwise the abstraction ∅ leads to false attacks.
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Protocol Initialization Fixed-Point Verification
Translation Setup Computation |FP| |TI| Safe NBE Unsafe
Keyserver_2_1 00:00:04 00:00:09 00:00:04 22 27 00:00:45 00:00:10 00:00:07
Keyserver_3_1 00:00:05 00:00:10 00:00:04 31 40 00:01:56 00:00:14 00:00:07
Keyserver_4_1 00:00:05 00:00:09 00:00:04 40 53 00:04:41 00:00:24 00:00:07
Keyserver2_2_1 00:00:05 00:00:10 00:00:04 9 4 00:00:28 00:00:09 00:00:07
Keyserver2_3_1 00:00:05 00:00:10 00:00:04 12 6 00:00:41 00:00:09 00:00:07
Keyserver2_4_1 00:00:05 00:00:10 00:00:04 15 8 00:00:58 00:00:10 00:00:07
Keyserver_Composition_2_1 00:00:07 00:00:10 00:00:04 40 105 00:37:09 00:02:12 00:00:08
Keyserver_Composition_3_1 00:00:07 00:00:11 00:00:05 56 153 02:58:28 00:08:26 00:00:09
Keyserver_Composition_4_1 00:00:07 00:00:10 00:00:08 70 201 10:02:24 00:22:45 00:00:09
TLS12simp 00:00:08 00:00:10 00:00:21 48 20 timeout 08:57:43 00:00:13
NSLclassic 00:00:05 00:00:10 00:00:06 43 6 00:05:27 00:00:13 00:00:08
NSPKclassic 00:00:05 00:00:10 00:00:06 69 6 attack attack attack
PKCS_Model03 00:00:05 00:00:10 00:00:05 8 2 00:00:14 00:00:09 00:00:07
PKCS_Model07 00:00:11 00:00:11 00:00:07 15 5 01:06:11 00:01:36 00:00:11
Table I
RUNTIME MEASUREMENTS (TIME FORMAT: hh:mm:ss). EXPERIMENTS THAT TOOK LONGER THAN 18 HOURS ARE MARKED WITH “TIMEOUT”.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND RELATED WORK
The research into automated verification of security proto-
cols resulted in a large number of tools (e.g., [23], [25], [26],
[27], [7]). The implementation of these tools usually focuses
on efficiency, often resulting in very involved verification algo-
rithms. The question of the correctness of the implementation
is not easy to answer and this is in fact one motivation for
research in using LCF-style theorem provers for verifying
protocols (e.g., [1], [19], [28], [29], [2], [16]). While these
works provide a high level of assurance into the correctness
of the verification result, they are usually interactive, i.e., the
verification requires a lot of expertise and time.
This trade-off between the trustworthiness of verification
tools and the degree of automation inspired research of com-
bining both approaches [4], [5], [6]. Goubault-Larrecq [4]
considers a setting where the protocol and goal are given
as a set S of Horn clauses; the tool output is a set S∞ of
Horn clauses that are in some sense saturated and such that
the protocol has an attack iff a contradiction is derivable. His
tool is able to generate proof scripts that can be checked by
Coq [30] from S∞. Meier [6] developed Scyther-proof [31],
an extension to the backward-search used by Scyther [7],
which is able to generate proof scripts that can be checked
by Isabelle/HOL [32]. Brucker and Mödersheim [5] integrate
an external automated tool, OFMC [27], into Isabelle/HOL.
OFMC generates a witness for the correctness of the protocol
that is used within an automated proof tactic of Isabelle.
Our work generalizes on these existing approaches for au-
tomatically obtaining proofs in an LCF-style theorem prover,
first and foremost by the support for stateful protocols and thus
a significantly larger range of protocols—moving away from
simple isolated sessions to distributed systems with databases,
or devices that have a long-term storage.
We achieve this by employing the abstraction-based verifica-
tion technique of AIF [22], but with an important modification.
The method of AIF produces a set of Horn clauses that is
then analyzed with ProVerif [23] (or SPASS[33]), and the
same holds true also for several similar methods for stateful
protocol verification, namely StatVerif [8], Set-π [13], AIF-
ω [14] and GSVerif [9]. Note that definite Horn clauses in
first-order predicate logic always have a trivial model (interpret
all predicates as true for all arguments), and we are actually
interested in the free model (free algebra for the functions and
least model of the predicates). This is achieved in ProVerif
(and SPASS) by checking whether the Horn clauses imply a
given attack predicate. If they do, then the attack predicate is
true also in the free model. If they do not, i.e., if the Horn
clauses are consistent with the negation of the attack predicate,
then the attack predicate is not true in all models, and in
particular not in the free model since it is the least model.
Thus, in a positive verification, the result from ProVerif is a
consistent saturated set of Horn clauses. As first remarked by
Goubault-Larrecq [4], this is not a very promising basis for
a proof, as one does not get a derivation of a formula (the
way SPASS for instance is often used in combination with
Isabelle) but rather a failure to conclude a proof goal. The only
chance to verify the resulting saturated set of Horn clauses, is
to recompute the saturation and compare. Therefore [4] uses a
different idea: showing that the Horn clauses and the negation
of the attack predicate are consistent by trying to find some
finite model and, if found, then using this finite model to
generate a proof in Coq that the Horn clauses are consistent
with the negation of the attack predicate.
The limitation of [4] is that it checks the protocol proofs
only on the Horn clause level, i.e., after a non-trivial abstrac-
tion has been applied. In order to obtain Isabelle proofs for the
original unabstracted stateful protocols, we use therefore an-
other approach: rather than Horn clauses, we directly generate
a fixed point of abstract facts that occur in any reachable state.
This would in fact normally not terminate on most protocols
due to the intruder deduction; however, we employ here the
typing result we have formalized in Isabelle [12] to ensure
that the fixed point is always finite and our method is in fact
guaranteed to terminate. This fixed point, if it does not contain
the attack predicate, is the core of a correctness proof for the
given protocol, namely as an invariant that the fixed point
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covers everything that can happen and we essentially have to
check that this invariant indeed holds for every transition rule
of the protocol.
An interesting difference to previous approaches is that we
do not rely on an external tool for the generation of the
proof witness, but that it is implemented within Isabelle itself.
The reason is more of a practical than a principle matter:
Computing the fixed point in Isabelle is actually not difficult
and—thanks to Isabelle’s code generation—without much of a
performance penalty; however, the fact that we do not rely on
an external tool for the generation of the proof witness reduces
the chances of synchronization and update problems (e.g., with
new Isabelle versions). In fact, this work is part of the Archive
of Formal Proofs9, a collection of Isabelle proofs that are kept
up to date with each new version of Isabelle. This means that
for each protocol that works in today’s version it is highly
likely that the proof works in future versions, because the
proofs of all theorems of our (protocol-independent) Isabelle
theory will be updated, and the fixed point and the checks
about it do not have to change. Thus we will also automatically
benefit from all advances of Isabelle.
Another difference to previous approaches is that we do not
directly generate proof scripts that Isabelle has to then check.
Rather, we have a fixed (protocol-independent) set of theorems
that imply that any protocol is secure if we have computed
a fixed-point representation that gives an upper bound of
what (supposedly) can happen and this representation passes
a number of checks. These checks can either be done by gen-
erated code or entirely within Isabelle’s simplifier. Especially
with the generated code we have a substantial performance
advantage, while using Isabelle’s simplifier gives the highest
level of assurance since we only rely on the correctness of
the Isabelle kernel. We note that also the generated code
is correct “by construction” and thus extremely unlikely to
compute wrong results. Many small practical advantages arise
from the integration: We do not have an overhead of parsing of
proof scripts (which can be substantial for a larger fixed point).
By using the internal API of Isabelle, we avoid the need for
the Isabelle front-end parser to parse and type-check the fixed
point (as we can directly generate a typed fixed-point on the
level of the abstract syntax tree). Parsing and type-checking
(on the concrete syntax level) of large generated theories (as,
e.g., ones containing the generated fixed point) is, in fact, slow
in Isabelle [5].
Another point is that there exist a number of protocol
verification methods and results that use slightly different
models. Here we actually seamlessly integrate a verification
method into a rich Isabelle theory of protocols without any
semantic gaps: We provide here a method that is integrated
into a large framework of Isabelle theories for protocols
(approximately 25,000 lines of code), in particular a typing
and compositionality result. This allows for instance to prove
manually (in the typed model) the correctness of a protocol,
use our automated method to prove the correctness of a
9See https://www.isa-afp.org.
different protocol, and then compose the proof to obtain the
correctness of the composition in an untyped model. This
seamless integration of results without semantic gaps between
tools we consider as an important benefit of this approach.
Even though many protocol models are not substantially
different from each other, bridging over the small differences
can be very hard to do, especially in a theorem prover that
prevents one from glossing over details. Our deep integration
into the existing formalization of security protocols in Isabelle
ensures that the same protocol model (same semantics) is
used—which would otherwise require additional work (e.g.,
to ensure that the semantics of the protocol specified in a tool
such as Scyther-proof is faithfully represented in the generated
Isabelle theory).
It is in general desirable to have proofs that are not only
machine-checked but also human-readable. A reason is that,
for instance, mistakes in the specification itself (e.g., a mistake
in a sent message so that it cannot be received by anybody)
may lead to trivial security proofs which a human may notice
when trying to understand the proof. Here Scyther-proof has
the benefit that it produces very readable Isar-style proofs; in
our case, there is, however, something that is also accessible:
the fixed point that was computed is actually a high-level proof
idea that is often quite readable as well (see for instance
our running example). Moreover, the entire set of protocol-
independent theorems are hand-written Isar-style proofs.
Furthermore, our work shares a lot of conceptual similarities
with Tamarin [10] in the sense that we also provide a protocol
verification environment that allow for the seamless transition
between a fully automated verification and an interactive veri-
fication approach. As the interactive verification component of
our tool is based on Isabelle/HOL, the user can make use of all
available Isabelle features, including its generic proof automa-
tion tools such as sledgehammer [34]. In contrast, Tamarin
is a domain-specific theorem prover whose implementation is
not based on a generic, widely reviewed, interactive theorem
prover. As its design is, in our understanding, not based on
an LCF approach, the risks of bugs in Tamarin resulting in
wrong verification results is potentially higher compared to
a tool following an LCF approach. As Tamarin shares ideas
with Scyther, generating Isabelle proofs from Tamarin using
a similar approach as Scyther-proof should in principle be
possible. While this would be a very interesting extension—
enabling automated or semi-automated support for a very large
class of protocols—it does not seem immediate to achieve.
Finally, another approach that, like Tamarin, is very much
related to performing actual proofs of security protocols au-
tomatically and semi-automatically is CPSA [35], [36]. Also
here it might be possible to make a connection to a theorem
prover of Isabelle; however, the approach is even further away
from our approach than Tamarin, because CPSA does not
necessarily assume a closed world of transactions. Rather,
it performs an enrich-by-need analysis obtaining all ways
to complete a particular scenario and thereby yielding the
strongest security goals a given system would satisfy (even in
the presence of other transactions). We believe it is even more
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challenging to integrate this kind of reasoning into a theorem
prover like Isabelle, but achievable. We like to investigate this
as future work as it could give interesting ways for an analyst
to interact with the proving process and inject proof ideas.
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APPENDIX
A PROBLEM WITH THE AIF-ω SPECIFICATION
09-LOST_KEY_ATT_COUNTERED.AIFOM
When we tried to model this specification from the AIF-ω
distribution, which is classified as secure by the AIF-ω tool,
we failed to prove it secure with our approach in Isabelle, and
in fact, our fixed-point generation was generating the attack
constant. Going back to the AIF-ω verification we noticed
that there was a problem with the public functions, in this
case symmetric encryption and hashing. They were declared
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as public in the AIF-ω specification, but the intruder seemed
unable to make use of them and get to the attack we had
obtained.
In fact the problem was that AIF-ω does not generate
intruder rules for the function symbols that are declared as
public, so unless the user explicitly states rules like “if the
intruder knows x then he also knows h(x))”, the function
symbol is like a private one that the intruder cannot apply
himself. When we add appropriate rules for all public function
symbols to the specification, also AIF-ω finds the attack.
One could argue that this is a problem of the specification
(the modeler was in fact aware of this behavior), however,
it can be considered a bug of AIF-ω, since the keyword
“public” for a function symbol at least suggests that the
composition rule would be automatically included. In this
sense, our Isabelle verification has revealed a mistake, in
particular one that has led to an erroneous “verification” of
a flawed protocol by an automated tool. In fact, the attack is
not a false positive (i.e., the original specification also has an
attack).
ISABELLE/PSPSP
We implemented our approach on top of Isabelle/HOL.
This includes a formalization of the protocol model in Is-
abelle/HOL, a data type package that provides a domain spe-
cific language (called trac) for specifying security protocols,
and fully automated proof support.
Figure 1 shows the Isabelle IDE (called Isabelle/jEdit). The
upper part of the window is the input area that works similar to
a programming IDE, i.e., supporting auto completion, syntax
highlighting, and automated proof generation and interactive
proof development. The lower part shows the current output
(response) with respect to the cursor position. In more detail,
Figure 1 shows the specification, and both the fully-automated
and the interactive verification of a toy keyserver protocol:
• The protocol is specified using a domain-specific lan-
guage that, e.g., could also be used by a security protocol
model checker (line 9–59). Our implementation automat-
ically translates this specification into a family of formal
HOL definitions. Moreover, basic properties of these
definitions are also already proven automatically (i.e.,
without any user interaction): for this simple example,
already 350 theorems are automatically generated.
• Next (line 62) our implementation automatically shows
that the protocol satisfies the requirement of our model
(Technically, this is done by instantiating several Isabelle
locales, resulting in another 1750 theorems “for free.”).
• In line 65, we compute the fixed point. We can use
Isabelle’s value-command (line 75) to inspect its size.
After these steps, all definitions and auxiliary lemmas for the
security proof are available. We can now have two options:
1) we can do a fully automated proof (line 71). This top-
level command proofs automatically a lemma showing
the security of the defined protocol.
2) we can interactively (manually) proof the security of
the defined protocol. For this, we provide a top-level
Figure 1. Using Isabelle/PSPSP for verifying a toy keyserver protocol.
command (manual_protocol_security_proof, line 74)
that generates a proof obligation that can be discharged
by an interactively developed proof script (line 76–82).
Finally, we can inspect the theorem using the thm command
(line 85 and following).
Summarizing, our implementation allows a non Isabelle-
expert to specify security protocols and to verify them auto-
matically. If the fully automated proof attempt fails, a seamless
switch to an interactive proof attempt (requiring at least some
knowledge of Isabelle/HOL) is possible.
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